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THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION TO CASES OF DISSIMILAR
PRODUCTS

The right to prevent unfair competition in the use of a tradename has long been established, and the importance of this right
is increasing as the commercial value of trade-names increases.
With the growing tendency of business organizations to produce
a variety of articles, attempts have become more frequent to
deny to another person the use of a trade-name, not only for the
same product to which the name is applied by the complainant,
but also for products that form no part of his business. The
products of the two parties may bear a similarity to each other,
or they may be related in some way without being actually similar, or there may be circumstances which give rise to the charge
that the use of the name is unfair, even though there is no apparent resemblance or relationship between the articles.
It is easy to state the general principles of law that apply to
cases of this nature, but it is difficult to derive from the cases
any definite boundary between what constitutes unfair competition and what does not Obviously the degree of resemblance or
the nearness of relation cannot be measured by any mathematical
formula. Confusion has arisen from the fact that in many of the
cases the Courts have attempted to apply dicta from previous cases
(197)
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as though they were precise formulae, instead of working directly
from the basic equitable principles that are the foundations of the
law of this subject.
The foundation principle of unfair competition cases, involving the use of trade-names, is that one may not palm off his goods
as the goods of another.' It is not the purpose of this doctrine to
give a complete monopoly in the use of a trade-name, but to prevent injustice to the prior adopter of the name, in loss of trade,
and injustice to purchasers who would be deceived into buying
what they otherwise would not buy. It was never the law that
one who adopted a name for one kind of goods could prevent others from using the name at all, regardless of whether it would
cause injustice or not. The right to prevent the use of a name
is therefore restricted to cases in which the complainant can show
that the use of the name tends to produce confusion and to injure
his business. Where there are no circumstances that would cause
the public to think the products bearing the same name were made
by the same party, no wrong is done. The classic example given
in Ainsworth v. Walnsley: 2 "If he does not carry on a trade in
iron, but carries on a trade in linen and stamps a lion on his
linen, another person may stamp a lion on iron," is still the law.3
From this grew the statement, apparently obvious but actually misleading, that there can be no unfair competition where
there is no competition at all, which is still commonly inserted in
opinions in cases where relief is refused because of dissimilarity
of the products. 4
'Croft v. Day, 7 Beav. 84 (Eng., 1843) ; Shaver v. Heller & Merz Co., io8
Fed 821 (C. C. A., i9oi); Heublein v. Adams, 125 Fed. 782 (C. C., 1903);
A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Fuller, 218 Fed. 786 (C. C. A., 1914) ; Moline

Plow Co. v. Omaha Iron Store Co.,
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Fed. 519 (C. C. A., 1916); 0. & W.

Thum Co. v. Dickinson, 245 Fed. 6o9 (C. C. A., 1917); Charles Broadway

Rouss, Inc. v. Winchester Co., 3o0 Fed. 7o6 (C. C. A.,

1924).

'L. R. [i Eq.] 518 (1866).
' Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U. S. 403 (1915).
'Clark v. Freeman, ii Beav. 112 (Eng., 1848) ; Simplex Automobile Co. v.

Kahnweiler, 162 App. Div. 480, 147 N. Y. Supp. 617 (914); Hub Dress Mfg.
Co. v. Rottenberg, 237 Mass. 281, 129 N. E. 442 (1921) ; Borden Ice Cream

Co. v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co., 201 Fed. 51O (C. C. A., 1912) ; Beech-Nut
Packing Co. v. P. Lorillard Co., 299 Fed. 834 (D. C., 1924), 7 F. (2d) 967
(C. C. A., 1925). The same statement of principle is applied in an entirely different way, which does not meet the present objection, in cases where there is
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Cases have arisen, however, where the products of the complainant and of the alleged infringer, while not identical, were so
similar that it would naturally be supposed that they would be
made by the sarte rhanufddu rer, and where it was evident that the
ise of the name Would actually be unfair. In The Collins Company v. Oliver Ames & Sons Corporation,5 the defendant was
enjoined from placing on shovels the name "Collins & Co.,"
which the plaintiff had previously used on axes, though the plaintiff had not used the name on shovels. The Court had no diffictity iii decidiflg that this act was urifair, but in doing so it parted,
ahd siibfild have parted forever, with the theory that the basis of
the doctrine was the direct loss of sales of axes. Shovels do not
compete ift the niarket with axes; if this is unfair competition, it
is because the expressiofi iis actiired a techfiial meaning with
the emphasis on the ihifairn~ss iather than on the competition.
The wrongfulness of the defendant's act lay in the fact that it
would deceive the public and imperil the plaintiff's reputation for
making high quality tools. If people believed the shovels were
made by the plaintiff, and they found them of poor quality, they
would suppose that the plaintiff's products in general were of
poor quality. The defendant was palming off his goods as the
goods of another, and the plaintiff's reputation was at his mercy,
though there was no competition in the ordinary sense of the
word. No case has professed to overrule this one, and cases decided in favor of plaintiffs usually cite it as a leading authority,
and still the same Courts, when they happen to be refusing injunctions, continue to say that there can be no unfair competition when
there is no competition at all.
no competition because the parties are in different territories. For example, in
Chapin-Sacks Mfg. Co. v. Hendler Creamery Co., 254 Fed. 553 (C. C. A.,
1918), where the parties sold ice cream under the same trade name in Washington and Baltimore, respectively, an injunction was refused as to Baltimore, but
granted as to Annapolis, where the territories overlapped. The plaintiff had no
reputation nor good will in Baltimore. See also Carroll v. Duluth Superior
Milling Co., 232 Fed. 675 (C. C. A., 1916); Kaufman v. Kaufman, 223 Mass.
i04, iii N. E. 691 (I916). Clearly a local business cannot monopolise a trade
name for the entire country, and yet with the growth of the chain-store and
like organizations, the time may come when equity will require a modification
of this rule also.
9 18 Fed. 561 (C. C., z882).
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It is now established beyond controversy 6 that the products
need not be the same, in order that relief may be granted. There
need not be confusion in the narrow sense that one article would
be mistaken for the other, nor competition in the sense that the
consumer's need for the one would be fulfilled by his purchase of
the other. Thus we find the complainant successful in cases of
baking powder and baking soda,7 washing powder and sweeping
powder,8 aluminum cooking utensils and tin wash boilers, 9 beer
and malt syrup, 10 bicycle supplies and bicycle oil," toilet soap
and shaving soap,1 2 toilet brushes and toothbrushes,' 8 player
pianos and phonographs, 14 meat extracts for medicine and beef
extract for food,' 5 fine cut tobacco and cigarettes,' 6 automobiles
and tires,' 7 bicycles and bicycle tires,' flour and bread, 19 pancake
flour and syrup,20 canned salmon and canned fruits, 21 and most
22
recently, men's suits and men's hats and caps.
'But see Simplex Automobile Co. v. Kahnweiler, supra, note 4, where an
injunction against the use of the name "Simplex" for fire extinguishers was refused on the ground that a salesman could not deceive a purchaser by attempting
to substitute a fire extinguisher for an automobile; an example of the extreme
conservative viewpoint, and entirely out of line with the Federal Court cases.
'Church

& Dwight Co. v. Russ, 99 Fed. 276 (C. C., i9oo) ; Layton Pure

Food Co. v. Church & Dwight Co., 182 Fed. 35 (C. C. A., i9io).
'Van Zile v. Norub Mfg. Co., 228 Fed. 829 (D. C., i9i6).
9 Aluminum Cooking Utensil Co. v. Sargoy Bros. & CO., 276 Fed. 447
(D. C., ig9i).

" Anheuser Busch v. Budweiser Malt Products Corp., 287 Fed. 243 (D. C.,
Ruppert v. Knickerbocker Food Specialty Co., 295 Fed. 381 "(D. C.,

i92i) ;

1923).

" Dunlop Pneumatic Tire Co. v. Dunlop Lubricant Co., 16 Rep. Pat. Cas.
(Cutler) 12 (Eng., 1899).
"Waltke & Co. v. Schafer & Co., 263 Fed. 65o (C. of A., D. C., I92o).
Florence Mfg. Co. v. J. C. Dowd & Co., 178 Fed. 73 (C. C. A., 1gIO).
"Wilcox & White Co. v. Leiser, 276 Fed. 445 (D. C., i918).
'Valentine Meat Juice Co. v. Valentine Extract Co., 83 L. T. 259, 17 Rep.
Pat. Cas. (Cutler) 673 (Eng., 1goo).
"American Tobacco Co. v. Polacsek, 17o Fed. 117 (C. C., I9O9).
"Willys-Overland Co. v. Akron-Overland Tire Co., 268 Fed. I5i (D. C.,
1920), 273 Fed. 674 (C. C. A., I92I).
12

IDunlop Pneumatic Tire Co. v. Dunlop-Truffault Cycle & Tube Mfg. Co.,
T. L. R- 434 (1896).
"Potter-Wrightington, Inc., v. Ward Baking Co., 288 Fed. 597 (D. C.,

1923), 298 Fed. 398 (C. C. A., 1924).

" Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 Fed. 407 (C. C. A., 1917).
'California Packing Co. v. Halferty, 295 Fed. 229 (C. of A., D. C., 1924).
= Rosenberg Bros. v. Elliott, 7 F. (2d) 962 (C. C. A., i925).
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In all these cases, as in the axe and shovel case, 23 there is a
similarity in appearance, material or purpose, or else a relationship
based on complementary use, which is fairly self-evident. There
have been some cases, however, where the relationship depends
upon quite different and less obvious factors. In Walter v. Ashton

24

the defendant was enjoined from calling its bicycle a

"Times Bicycle," and representing that it was made by or for the
Times newspaper; and in Eastman Co. v. John Crfflths Cycle
Corp.25 it was held that the defendant should not be permitted to
sell "Kodak Bicycles," because the plaintiff sold cameras attachable to bicycles and called them "Bicycle Kodaks."
Similarly in out Federal Courts, cigars sold in drug stores
were forbidden the use of a name that plaintiff had applied to
drugs; 26 a manufacturer of women's hats was enjoined from
27
using for its hats the name of a magazine of women's fashions
and a manufacturer of radio tubes was enjoined from calling
them "Rolls-Royce" tubes, at the suit of the makers of the auto28
mobile of that name.
The basis for these decisions is fundamentally that the public
would be likely to believe that the defendant's product was the
plaintiff's. The test to be applied is variously expressed. In the
cases where the goods are actually similar, similarity is generally
laid down as the test, or it is said that the goods must be of the
"same general class," 20 or "of the same class though not of the
same species." 80 In the more recent cases where there was no
'4The Collins Co. v. Oliver Ames & Sons Corp., supra, note 5.
"[1902] 2 Ch. 282.
iS Rep. Pat Cas. (Cutler) io5 (Eng., 1898).
Peninsular Chemical Co. v. Levinson, 247 Fed. 658 (C. C. A., 1917).
Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 3oo Fed. 5o9 (C. C. A., 1924).
:Wall v. Rolls-Royce, 4 F . (2d) 333 (C. C. A., 1925).
Waltke & Co. v. Schafer & Co., supra, note 12.
'Layton Pure Food Co. v. Church & Dwight Co., supra, note 7. The expression "same descriptive properties" comes from the Trademark Act and is
the test in registration proceedings in the Patent Office. Confusion is occasionally caused by Courts citing the report of an appeal from the Commissioner
of Patents as a precedent in an unfair competition case, and using this expression as though it represented a rule binding upon a court of equity. Judge
Woolley in his opinion in Rosenberg Bros. v. Elliott, supra, note 22, points out
that trademark and unfair competition law are not the same, and a trademark
is not infringed by use on different but related wares, though this may constitute
unfair competition.
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similarity in the goods themselves, different terms have had to be
employed, and the word "related" has come into use.31
It is evident from these cases that competition in the ordinary sense of the term is not a necessary element in "unfair competition," as the expression is used in law, nor do the products
of the contending parties need to be "similar" in the ordinary
sense of that word. The granting of relief, where there is no real
similarity, has not been consistent nor uniform, however, and the
Courts have in some cases been much more conservative than in
the cases cited above. Thus injunctions have been refused in
cases of ice cream and milk,32 canned salmon and canned
fruits,33 apartment house and hotel,3 4 character in detective story
magazine and character in moving picture film,3 5 wheat flour and
prepared pancake and buckwheat flours,30 and varied food prod37

ucts and tobacco.

It is apparent at a glance that upon a mere statement of the
products involved, some of the latter cases show a closer relationship than some of the former, as, for example, ice cream and milk
as against magazines and hats. This does not necessarily show
inconsistency, since other factors frequently enter into the decisions. 38 Nevertheless there is much real inconsistency between
'1
Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., supra, note 20.
"Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co., supra, note 4.
" George v. Smith, 52 Fed. 83o (C. C., 1892).
" Astor v West 82nd St. Realty Co., 167 App. Div. 273, 152 N. Y. Supp.
631 (1915).
"Atlas Mfg. Co. v. Street & Smith, 204 Fed. 398 (C. C. A., 1913).
" France Milling Co. v. Washburn-Crosby Co., 3 F. (2d) 321 (D. C., 1925).
' Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. P. Lorillard Co., supra, note 4.
" Thus the matter of descriptive words may enter into the case, as in Pabst
Brewing Co. v. Decatur Brewing Co., 284 Fed. 11o (C. C. A., 1922), where the
use of the name "Blue Ribbon" for malt extract was held not to infringe upon
the prior adoption of the same name for beer, not because the products were not
similar, but because "Blue Ribbon" is a name frequently used to denote high
quality, i. e., a quasi-descriptive word. The question of similarity of products
may of course be combined in a case with any other problem of unfair competition law. A factor that sometimes appears is the intention of the plaintiff to
expand his business so as to include the article to which defendant has applied
the same name. See Wilcox & White Co. v. Leiser, supra, note 14, and Ruppert
v. Knickerbocker Food Specialty Co., supra, note io. While this is a point in
favor of the plaintiff, it is not an essential element to his case, and its use in the
opinions must therefore be regarded as a "make-weight," or as mere evidence
that the products are related.
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the cases, even in the same jurisdictions, and to an even greater
extent confusion in the reasoning of the opinions, because the
Courts in cases that really depend upon other factors seldom fail
to throw tie question of similarity into the argument on one side
or the other.
The tendency to support a decision by every possible argument is so strong that in cases where the Court might be fully
justified in refusing an injunction on other grounds, it often attempts to clinch the argument by saying that the products are
not related, or even by going all the way back to the theory that
thp goqds had to be in actual competition, without however repudiating apy of the cases where injunctions have been granted in
cases of dissipnilar and non-competing prpducts. 39
It is evident that relation of products is of no value as a test
unless it is decided what kind of relation is meant. There is certaijny some kind of relation between apartment houses and hotels,
and between milk and, ice cream, even though in their cases it
was not of the kind that satisfied the Court that there should be
an injunction. If we say we are restricting the meaning of the
word "related", using it in a narrower or technical sense, we
are virtually saying that the goods are related when, by means
of some other test, applied consciously or unconsciously, the
Court feels that the defendant's course of action is unfair. It
seems probable that this represents what actually occurs; that what
really motivates the Judges is whether under the circumstances
of the particular case, the public would probably think that the
two articles were made by the same party. A layman reading the
facts of the Rolls-Royce case,40 for example, would instantly say
"Thus in France Milling Co. v. Washburn-Crosby Co., supra, note 36, the
Court refused to enjoin the use of the name "Gold Medal" for prepared pancake and buckwheat flour because it was already in use for wheat flour. This
case could have been decided entirely on the ground that "Gold Medal," like
"Blue Ribbon" (see Pabst Brewing Co. v. Decatur Brewing Co., supra, note 38)
was a quasi-descriptive name, but the Court, not content with this ground alone,
thought it necessary to add that wheat flour and prepared pancake flour were
"different classes of commodities"; not, however, either attempting to distinguish
nor professing to repudiate Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., supra, note
20, which held that pancake flour and syrup were related products, nor PotterWrightington, Inc. v. Ward Baking Co., supra, note i, which held that flour
and bread were sufficiently related. •
4'Wall v. Rolls-Royce, supra, note 28.
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the defendant's act was unfair. A Court probably comes to the
same conclusion as quickly, but to justify its conclusion must employ the far-fetched reasoning that automobiles and radio tubes
are related because they both involve the use of electricity, which
would lead with equal logic to the conclusion that submarines and
pocket flashlights are related products. It is much more certain
that the use of the name "Rolls-Royce" for radio tubes is unfair
than that radio tubes and automobiles are related products.
Thus the present state of the law is virtually that two separate requirements must be met, namely, that the use of the name
must be unfair and that the products must be similar or related,
whereas the original and only reasonable purpose of the relationship test was to assist in determining whether the use of the
name was unfair.
It seems apparent that the test of relationship is properly a
mere rule of thumb for applying a principle of law and is not a
real principle of law in itself, and that it must be discarded whenever it ceases to be a fair and convenient measure. The present
confusion results largely from the Courts feeling that they are
bound to use this test as though it were a fixed rule of law in
cases where it is not the factor that actually guides them to their
conclusion. In some instances this results in a good decision supported by bad reasoning, but there is little doubt that it often hinders the Courts from stopping unfair practices, and stands in the
way of the natural expansion of the law to meet changing economic conditions.
As commercial organization becomes more complex, it is
becoming more usual for a corporation to manufacture or sell a
wide variety of products. Many companies produce articles that
have no similarity, nor any relationship beyond the fact that they
are so produced. Such a concern frequently applies the same
trade-name to all its products in the hope that the good-will of
the older products will attach to the newer ones. The public has
become so accustomed to the idea of dissimilar articles being produced by the same company that it is hardly surprised at any combination whatever. It would not be regarded as utterly preposterous for the same company even to sell iron and linen. The
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dissimilarity of commodities or services does not necessarily cause
the public to suppose they are produced by different concerns.
Railroads run restaurants, colleges run stores, hotels run barber
shops and garages, and religious denoiinations conduct bookshops. A thousand opportunities present themselves to the tradename pirate, of which he can take advantage without overstepping the law as laid down in the more conservative cases.
Unless equity jurisdiction expands in conformity with the
evolution of business, it will cease to be effective as a check upon
unfair hiethcds of doing business. So-called unfair competition
is really the theft of an intangible form of property, the goodwill that has cohe from tile use of the name. The monetary
value of tihfs kind of good-Will is indicated by the vast sums that
are spent for advertising. If tinder modem conditions of business it is possible for a person to appropriate a part of this intangible property of another Without producihg a commodity similar
or related to his products, shoutd equity be powerless to prevent
him ? The Vogue case, 41 the Rolls-Royce case, 42 and the Penslar
case, 48 are steps in the right direction, but equity will not be entirely free to enjoin new and unusual forms of trade-name piracy
until the Courts cease to bind themselves by auxiliary tests and
begin freely and directly to apply to these cases the elementary
equitable principle upon which the whole law of this subject is
44
based.
The principle is that one may not palm off his goods as the
goods of another. The test is that he may not use a previously
adopted name for goods that are similar or related. Is it not
evident that the test grew up in application of the principle and
not in limitation of it? If, then, a condition arises where a man
"Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., supra, note 27.
"Wall v. Rolls-Royce, supra, note 28.
' Peninsular Chemical Co. v. Levinson, supra, note 26.
"The progressive viewpoint is tersely stated by judge Hook, in the "Nick
Carter" case, Atlas Mfg. Co. v. Street & Smith, supra, note 35, in which the
majority of the Court held that a moving picture having as its hero the central
character of a series of detective stories published in plaintiff's magazine was
not an infringement of plaintiff's rights, as follows: "My objection to the above
conclusion can be expressed in a sentence: The defendants are engaged in appropriating the fruits of complainants' current endeavors, and are deceiving the
public."
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may palm off his goods as the goods of another, although the
goods have no similarity or real relation, does not a true regard
for precedent require that the principle, rather than the test, be
applied?
This would not do away with similarity and relationship of
products as important factors, but instead of the question being
whether the goods were so related that defendant's actions
amounted to unfair competition, the inquiry would go directly to
the question whether defendant's use of the name, under all the
circumstances, was unfair. As evidence of unfairness, similarity
or relationship would be of the utmost importance, but the plaintiff would not be precluded from showing that in the particular
case there were other elements of unfairness even though the
most usual element were lacking. This would not mean that the
man who stamps a lion on linen could in the ordinary case prevent me from stamping a lion on iron. It would merely mean
that in the extraordinary case where such an action would make
the public believe it was his iron, I could not steal his good-will
with impunity by reason of the dissimilarity of the products.
Edward C. Lukens.
Philadelphia,Pa.

